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HARNED V. WATSON.

Feb. 1941.]

[17 C. (2d)

Tichenor, 156 Cal. 343 [104 Pac. 458, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.)
323], and People v. Moore, 48 Cal. App. 245 [191 Pac. 980].
[6] The trial court first instructed the jury that there
was no evidence to sustain the allegation of seduction and
that it could not award punitive damages. The court later
told the jury to disregard such instruction. The appellant
now complains that the giving and withdrawal of such instruction so confused the jury that it was prejudicial error
sufficient to compel a reversal. We have already determined
that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the award of
punitive damages as a result of seduction and we do not feel
that any prejudicial error was committed.
We are not unmindful of the fact that this is not the usual
breach of promise and seduction case, in which advantage was
taken of a young and innocent girl. The plaintiff was a
middle-aged woman who should have had sufficient worldly
wisdom to guard against the situation in which she now finds
herself. However, it cannot be denied that, on the faith of
the promises of the defendant, she has suffered injury. She
has given up her millinery business which was her only means
of livelihood, and she will undoubtedly have difficulty in
regaining it. Her relationship with the defendant was apparently well known, so that she must now suffer the silent or
outspoken criticism of her friends and the community in
which she must live. Such actions on the part of the plaintiff, in permitting the situation to exist, are not to be condoned, but when such acts occurred, actions for damages for
breach of promise and seduction were permissible under the
laws of this state. Evidence was sufficient to warrant the
verdict of the jury; therefore, such verdict and the resultant
judgment must be affirmed.
The judgment is affirmed.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN REED, Appellant.
[1] Homicide - Evidence-Weight and Su:fH.ciency-Evidence of

Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to support a conVIction of murder in
the first degree where it showed the possession of bills by
the deceased which he frequently exhibited in a store, defendant's patronage of such store, his identification on the
night of the murder as he came running from the direction
of the deceased's cabin, defendant's subsequent possession of
money with conflicting accounts as to the manner of its
acquisition, and blood stains on articles of his clothing.
[2] Oriminal Law-Appeal and Error-Harmless and Reversible
Error - Particular Errors - Argument and Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney-Oure by Striking Out and Instruction.
Any impropriety in the district attorney's question as to
whether the defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony is without prejudice where the district attorney later
stated that he asked the question in good faith expecting
to be able to prove the conviction by documentary evidence,
but that such evidence was not available and, therefore, he
requested that the matter be expunged from the record and
the jury instructed to disregard the question, and where the
court complied with the request.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County and from an order denying a new trial.
Charles L. Allison, Judge. Affirmed.
Charles D. Warner and Albert D. Trujillo for Appellant.
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, and Frank Richards, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

Shenk, J., Traynol', J., and Carter, J., concurred.

THE COURT.-John Reed and John Thurman were convicted of murder in the first degree. The jury recommended
life imprisonment for Thurman; Reed was sentenced to die.
They appeal from the judgment and the order denying their
motions for a new trial.

A petition for a rehearing was denied March 17, 1941.

1. See 13 Oal. Jur. 602; 26 Am. Jur. 183, 486; 13 R. O. L. 776.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Homicide, § 145 (5) i 2. Criminal Law,
§140S.
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PEOPLE V. REED.

Feb. 1941.]

[17 C. (2d)

[1] The evidence establishes the following facts: George
Stephenson, the deceased, lived alone in a cabin on the edge
of the Colorado River near the little settlement of Crossroads, located in the southeast corner of San Bernardino
County. He was sixty-nine years of age and received old
age pension checks monthly in the amount of $40. From
these payments he had saved about $300 or $350 which he carried on his person in a billfold. When making purchases at
the stores in Crossroads, it was not unusual for him to exhibit his savings and to exchange small bills for ones of larger
denomination.
Down the dirt road about 150 feet from Stephenson's cabin
was another cabin occupied by Henry Williams, an elderly
negro. On the evening of Friday, March 15, 1940, Stephenson visited Williams for about a quarter of an hour. Shortly
after Stephenson left to return to his own cabin, Williams
heard him call in an unusually loud voice, "What does all
this mean 1 What is this all about Y" Then all was quiet.
Williams became uneasy and after a few minutes seized an
ice pick and started for the Stephenson cabin. As he was
proceeding along the dirt road which skirted the dense arrow
weeds separating the two cabins, he saw two men come run. ning from the direction of Stephenson's cabin. One man
came within eight or ten feet of him. This man he later
identified as Reed. The other man appeared tall and thin,
but was not otherwise clearly visible. Williams then proceeded to the cabin, but finding no one there, hastened to
a nearby gas station and persuaded the proprietor to drive
back withhini. The latter found Stephenson a few yards
beyond the cabin, lying just at the brink of the river bed,
bound and gagged, with his head badly beaten. He died
a few hours later at the hospital. Upon search of his body
and premises neither his billfold nor his money could be
found.
For several months before the commission of the crime John
Reed had lived in the vicinity of Crossroads and patronized
the same stores in Crossroads as the deceased. One week
before the commission of the crime he secured a ride from
Phoenix, where he had been working, to Parker, a town in
Arizona not far from Crossroads, with a friend named Cox.
At this time Reed had little or no money. He stayed in a
cabin with Cox and another man named West, paying nothing
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for accommodations. Three days before the commISSIOn of
the crime, he met John Thurman, whom he had known for
several years in Parker, and who was now out of work and
without funds. The day before the crime Reed and Thurman
visited Crossroads in the company of a man named Young.
At that time Reed had a gun in his possession. On the
day of the homicide he went to Crossroads with a man named
Jack Hollis. At that time he wore a leather jacket and
had a bundle under his arm. Thurman was seen in CrossJ;'Oads the same afternoon. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon,
shortly before the homicide was committed, Thurman was
seen by two men who were acquainted with him walking
in the direction of the deceased's cabin in the company of a
man carrying a bundle under his arm.
That night Reed exhibited a roll of bills to West, saying
he had gotten them from an Indian to purchase liquor, and
offered to pay West $25 fol' a ride to Phoenix or Wickenburg.
West at first refused, having learned from Cox that Reed and
Thurman were under suspicion· with regard to the homicide,
but several days later West drove Reed to Phoenix and received $25. While in Phoenix, Reed, accompanied by a Mrs.
Scott with whom he was acquainted, purchased a suit of
clothes and a used car. He was then picked up by two police
officers. A wallet containing $113 was found in his car.
His suitcase containing a leather jacket and other articles
of clothing was found. The clothing was turned over to a
chemist who found blood stains on the sleeve of tha jacket
and a shirt. Upon being questioned about the money Reed
gave contradictory stories-that he got it from Mrs. Scott;
that he earned it selling whiskey; that he earned it selling
stolen goods; that he got it from an Indian to purchase
liquor.
Thurman left Parker several days after the homicide and
went to Wickenburg by train, and from there to Phoenix
by train. Then he bought a ticket to Herford, Texas, but
returned it and went to Fresno, California, by bus and thereafter by bus to Van Nuys where he was arrested. He had
spent about $47 on his trip and had $6 at the time of his
arrest.
At the preliminary examination Henry Williams testified
as to the circumstances surrounding the homicide and identified Reed as one of the men whom he had seen running from
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the deceased's cabin. Shortly thereafter Williams disappeared. His clothes were found on the bank of the Colorado
River near Crossroads, and his body was recovered from the
river in an identifiable condition. At the trial the testimony given by him at tl1e preliminary hearing was read into
the record.
The foregoing facts constitute evidence which, even though
circumstantial, is substantial enough to have established the
guilt of the two defendants in the minds of the jury.
[2] Defendants contend that the district attorney was
guilty of prejudicial misconduct at the trial in questioning
Reed as to whether or not he had been previously convicted
of a felony. On cross-examination Reed was asked whether
or not he had been convicted of stealing government property and sentenced under that conviction. The court permitted the question over objection by counsel for the defendants, and Reed answered "no". At the conclusion of
the testimony in the case the district attorney stated that
when he had asked the question regarding a prior conviction, he had asked it in good faith, expecting to be able to
prove the conviction by documentary evidence, but that such
evidence was not available, and he therefore requested that
the matter be expunged from the record and the jury instructed to disregard the question. The court complied with
the request. In view of this subsequent statement by the
district attorney, the expunging of the matter from the record
by the court in compliance with the district attorney's request, and the absence of any evidence of bad faith on the
part of the district attorney, there is no prejudicial misconduct requiring a reversal. (People v. Braun, 14 Cal. (2d) 1
[92 Pac. (2d) 402].)
The judgment and order of the trial court are affirmed.

[So F. No. 15969.

Department Two.-February 19, 1941.]

"LOUIS A. LONG, Respondent, V. MARGARET C. LONG,
Appellant.
[1] Divorce and Separation-Permanent Alimony-Modification
of Allowance-Effect of Absence of Alimony Provision in Decree.-A court which has provided for alimony payments for
a definite term without reserving the right to change or modify
the term is without power to make further allowance for the
wife's support after such alimony has been paid and the final
decree has been entered.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County, setting aside an order modifying an interlocutory decree of divorce. William P. James, Judge. Affirmed.
David M. Burnett and John M. Burnett for Appellant.'
Henry E. Monroe and Henriette W. Steinegger for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On January 7, 1930, the Superior Court
of Santa Clara County awarded appellant Margaret C. Long
an interlocutory decree of divorce against respondent Louis
A. Long directing him to pay appellant $50 a month alimony
for the six months from February 5, 1930, to and including
JUly 5, 1930. This alimony was duly paid. The final decree
of divorce, entered on March 30, 1931, neither awarded alimony to appellant nor reserved to the court jurisdiction
thereafter to make an allowance for appellant's support.
On November 10, 1931, on application of appellant supported
by an affidavit averring that because of injury she was no
longer able to support herself, the court after a hearing made
an order modifying the interlocutory decree of divorce by
requiring respondent to pay $50 a month alimony thenceforth until further order of the court. On December 20,

~~

1. Power to reopen decree of divorce which is silent as to or
expressly provides against alimony so as to permit modification
in that regard, note, 83 A. L. R. 1248. See, also, 1 Cal. Jur. 1035;
17 Am. Jur. 494.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Divorce and Separation, § 216 (2).
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